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I. INTRODUCTION
BITCOIN—to some people, it is “gold for nerds.”1 “A techno tourde force.”2 To others, it’s “rat poison.”3 However any given per-son might feel about cryptocurrencies, though, the underlying
technology—blockchain technology—is a technological breakthrough
that is reshaping industry after industry. While cryptocurrencies are the
most well-known application of blockchain, this technology is currently
being used in a variety of sectors, including supply chain management,4
government services,5 healthcare,6 food safety,7 identification,8 and
cybersecurity.9 Naturally, as the use of blockchain continues to grow, liti-
gation involving blockchain grows with it. Blockchain litigation was prac-
tically nonexistent before 2017. However, blockchain litigation began to
increase sharply when, notably, the price of Bitcoin reached its all-time
high of nearly $20,000 before crashing.10 This trend seems poised to con-
tinue. Accordingly, trial lawyers and judges across the country are likely
to soon find themselves grappling with the interplay of blockchain reports
and evidentiary law for the first time.
A careful study of this interplay between blockchain technology and
existing evidence law reveals two themes: (1) in most cases, blockchain
1. Daniel Mark Harrison, ‘Gold for Nerds’: The True Story of Blockchain, COIN-
SPEAKER (Dec. 21, 2014), https://www.coinspeaker.com/gold-for-nerds-the-true-story-of-
bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/58B7-SN84].
2. FOX Business (FOX television broadcast May 6, 2013), https://video.foxbusiness
.com/v/2359385547001/?#sp=show-clips [https://perma.cc/D4HQ-MNBN] (statement of Bill
Gates).
3. Id. (statement of Charlie Munger).
4. Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply Chain and Logistics
Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/03/23/
how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry/#207423a5fecd
[https://perma.cc/77FS-BE2P].
5. Amr Refaat, How the UAE Is Empowering Its Citizens Through Blockchain,
BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/
blockchain/2018/10/how-the-uae-is-empowering-its-citizens-through-blockchain [https://per
ma.cc/K2S2-MER7].
6. Quora, What Are the Use Cases for Blockchain Tech in Healthcare?, BLOCKCHAIN
PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/
2018/12/what-are-the-use-cases-for-blockchain-tech-in-healthcare [https://perma.cc/G25Q-
S4W5].
7. Roger Aitken, IBM Forges Blockchain Collaboration with Nestle´ & Walmart in
Global Food Safety, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/
2017/08/22/ibm-forges-blockchain-collaboration-with-nestle-walmart-for-global-food-safe
ty/#4364efaf3d36 [https://perma.cc/6NHQ-3BLR].
8. Simon Chandler, Blockchain-Based Digital ID Systems are Increasingly Finding
Real-World Use, COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/block
chain-based-digital-id-systems-are-increasingly-finding-real-world-use [https://perma.cc/
FA3P-YU94].
9. Rachel Wolfson, How a Leading Cyber Security Company Uses Blockchain to Pre-
vent Data Tampering, FORBES (July 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson/
2018/07/03/how-a-leading-cyber-security-company-uses-blockchain-technology-to-prevent-
data-tampering/#307dc8f14529 [https://perma.cc/LDY9-CYW7].
10. Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited,
COINDESK (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-
price-run-revisited [https://perma.cc/LAU8-9GYR].
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evidence is patently inadmissible; and (2) considering the purposes of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), in most cases, blockchain evidence
should be admissible.
Part II of this comment aims to provide a layman’s overview of how
blockchain works and what its vulnerabilities are. Part III explores the
applicable principles of the law of evidence and concludes that, as it cur-
rently stands, blockchain reports are only admissible in federal court in
limited circumstances through the residual exception to hearsay en-
shrined in FRE 809. Part IV begins by detailing the relatively sparse ex-
isting law addressing blockchain evidence and then responds to the
existing scholarship on the matter. Part V proposes an amendment to the
FRE that accounts for the vulnerabilities in blockchain without placing
undue burden on litigants needing to introduce blockchain evidence.11
II. BLOCKCHAIN BASICS (AND NOT-SO-BASICS)
A. BLOCKCHAIN—WHAT IT IS, AND HOW IT WORKS
Blockchain is a “peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a
public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally im-
practical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of
CPU power.”12 While there is no phrase in English that means exactly the
same thing, the closest translation is roughly “a publicly shared ledger
that is difficult to change.”
Blockchains are records that are shared across a group of computers,
called a “network.”13 Each computer, called a “node,” stores a copy of
the blockchain record.14 The network updates this record approximately
every ten minutes to see if there is new data that needs to be added to the
blockchain.15 Blockchain networks come in two principle types: public
and private.16 The distinction is essentially who can set up a computer to
serve as a node. In a public blockchain, anyone can download a copy of
the blockchain ledger and set up a new node on the network.17 Private
11. Blockchain evidence is a large topic and necessarily cannot be covered in one com-
ment. A myriad of issues will not be treated in depth here but still warrant some discussion.
First, litigants should be aware that, in most jurisdictions, expert testimony will be needed
to lay a foundation sufficient to admit blockchain evidence. Second, beyond a brief discus-
sion of Vermont’s statute, this comment does not endeavor to explore how blockchain fits
into state-level evidence law. While these two issues are far from the only topics which
cannot be explored here, they are sufficiently important such that trial attorneys should
bear them in mind when preparing a case involving blockchain evidence.
12. Satoshi Nakamodo, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN 8,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2SY-ZF6Y] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
13. Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to
Distributed and Centralized Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, 29 (2018).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 43.
16. Id. at 77, 79.
17. Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and Private Blockchain,
BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/
blockchain/2017/05/the-difference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/ [https://perma
.cc/CYF3-7CK3].
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blockchains, however, are permissioned—new nodes can only be estab-
lished by people who have been invited to join the network.18 As dis-
cussed below, this distinction is not currently addressed in the evidentiary
standards used for blockchain records but should be accorded heavy
weight when deciding admissibility.19
A blockchain transaction begins with users inputting data.20 Using
cryptocurrency as an example, a user will tell the network that she wants
to transmit a certain amount of currency to another user.21 This is a
“transaction.”22 The transaction is stored in a “block.”23 A block is like a
page in a physical ledger, it stores the information inputted by the users.24
A single block can contain an immense amount of data—for example, on
average, a block on the Bitcoin blockchain stores more than 500
transactions.25
New blocks are added to the chain by mining nodes (miners), powerful
computers that “group outstanding transactions into blocks and add them
to the blockchain . . . [b]y solving a complex mathematical puzzle . . . and
including the answer in the block.”26 These puzzles are essentially solved
by “guessing at random.”27 The hash encryption “makes it impossible to
predict what the output will be.”28 The miner that finally solves the
crypto puzzle announces the solution to the network.29
After a miner announces the new block to the network, the last step
before a block is added is achieving “consensus.”30 While there are a vari-
ety of different consensus mechanisms,31 they all share the same common
function. To decide whether a block should be added to the blockchain,
the nodes on the network follow a protocol to collectively determine if
the proposed block is legitimate.32 If it is, it is accepted by the network,
and the block becomes part of the chain; if it is not, then it does not.33
When consensus is reached, the miners begin working to solve a new
18. Id.
19. See infra Part V.





25. See Average Block Size, BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.blockchain.com/charts/avg-
block-size [https://perma.cc/NHT5-XGUR] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
26. Noelle Acheson, How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk





30. See Amy Castor, A (Short) Guide to Blockchain Consensus Protocols, COINDESK
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/short-guide-blockchain-consensus-protocols
[https://perma.cc/L74G-5RC6].
31. See id.
32. What Is a Blockchain Consensus Algorithm? BINANCE ACAD., https://binance.vi
sion/blockchain/what-is-a-blockchain-consensus-algorithm [https://perma.cc/D4HQ-
MNBN] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
33. Nakamodo, supra note 12, at 3.
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crypto puzzle and find a new block.34 In theory, consensus is what gives
the blockchain its reliability; disinterested third parties (nodes) are re-
sponsible for adding new information to the ledger.35 As explored below,
however, there is some risk of decentralization which undermines the re-
liability of the blockchain.36
Blocks are chained together by “hashes,” encrypted codes which are
made from the contents of the block and that identifies the block.37 Each
block contains its own hash, the hash of the previous block on the chain,
and the hash of the next block on the chain.38 These hashes chain to-
gether to give blockchain its immutable quality.39 Because each block’s
hash is developed from the contents of the block itself, changing any in-
formation in the block changes the block’s hash.40 This, in turn, is re-
flected in the hash of the following blocks.41
Figures 1 and 2, below, and the accompanying text illustrate this pivotal









Previous Block’s Hash: A




Previous Block’s Hash: B
Next Block’s Hash: D
Imagine that Block 1 contains transaction W, which gives it a hash value
of A. Block 2, with transaction X and hash A (from the preceding block),
receives a hash value of B. Block 3, with transaction Y and preceding
hash B returns a hash value of C, and so on. If one were to look at Block
3, it would show hash values of B (preceding block’s hash), C (its own
hash), and D (succeeding block’s hash).
34. Id.
35. See Mike Orcutt, How Secure Is Blockchain Really?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 25,
2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610836/how-secure-is-blockchain-really/
[https://perma.cc/7XC2-PGN9].
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. Bacon et al., supra note 13, at 12–13.
38. Id. at 16.
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 14.
41. Id. at 16.









Previous Block’s Hash: A
Block 3
Transaction Y
Previous Block’s Hash: α
Imagine, then, that changes were made to the transactions stored in
Block 2. Because the hash value of Block 2 is based on it containing con-
tent X, when changes are made to the contents, that changes the hash
value of Block 2. Because the hash value of Block 2 is recorded in Blocks
1 and 3, when it is altered, the change can be seen in every subsequent
block in the chain. The network then rejects the change.42
Because one of the animating concerns of evidentiary law is reliabil-
ity,43 the user-side verification protocols of blockchain require some dis-
cussion. Verification protocols ensure that the user inputting the data into
the blockchain is who he claims to be.44 While these vary from blockchain
to blockchain, the most common form of verification protocol uses a
“public key” and a “private key.”45 While the analogy is not technologi-
cally precise,46 for our purposes, it will suffice to think of a public key as a
username and a private key as a password. A user inputs his private key
before making a transaction, which (theoretically)47 validates his identity.
Finally, we turn to “smart contracts.” A smart contract is a “self-enforc-
ing agreement” created digitally over a blockchain.48 While traditional
contracts rely on courts for enforcement, smart contracts cut out the mid-
dleman and allow the contract to enforce itself.49 For example, parties
could create a smart contract where, after a party transmits a predeter-
mined amount of cryptocurrency, it automatically receives a document.
As soon as the cryptocurrency is paid, the network sends the document to
the recipient. Notably, a smart contract is not a contract in the legal
sense—it does not need to meet the same requirements that a court
42. See Nakamodo, supra note 12, at 8.
43. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 245 (7th ed. 2014).
44. See Nolan Bauerle, How Does Blockchain Technology Work?, COINDESK, https://
www.coindesk.com/information/how-does-blockchain-technology-work [https://perma.cc/
P4SP-A3W6] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
45. Id.
46. The technical differences between public keys and usernames and between private
keys and passwords have little relevance for the discussion of evidentiary principles. Ac-
cordingly, they are omitted for brevity and clarity. For an in-depth discussion of the tech-
nological aspects of public and private keys, see Bisade Asolo, Blockchain Public Key &
Private Key: A Detailed Guide, MYCRYPTOPEDIA (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.mycryptope
dia.com/public-key-private-key-explained/ [https://perma.cc/635P-2JAN].
47. See infra Part II.B.
48. Shermin Voshmgir, Smart Contracts, BLOCKCHAINHUB BERLIN, https://blockchain
hub.net/smart-contracts [https://perma.cc/RD3S-NDX5] (last updated July 2019).
49. Id.
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would hold a contract to before enforcing it.50 Accordingly, when discuss-
ing smart contracts, it is important to bear in mind that they are smart
“contracts.”
To establish a smart contract, parties create computer code that cap-
tures the agreement between them.51 These agreements then automati-
cally enforce themselves, and when the first party performs the first end
of the contract, the second party’s performance automatically occurs.52
To summarize the above discussion of relevant principles of blockchain
technology, blockchains can be public or private. Copies of the
blockchain record are stored on nodes across a network. This record is
constantly updating itself. Users input data. Miners solve crypto puzzles
to combine these transactions into a block. Blocks are added to the chain
through consensus. These blocks are chained together by a series of
hashes which ensure that if anything in the record is changed, the net-
work detects the alteration. Some blockchain interactions include smart
contracts which allow users to make self-enforcing agreements that cut
out the need to use third parties.
Now for the complex part.
B. BLOCKCHAIN’S VULNERABILITIES
To develop a useful standard for admissibility of blockchain evidence, it
is not enough to merely evaluate blockchain’s strengths. To ensure relia-
bility, a standard for admissibility must consider and account for
blockchain’s weaknesses, as the weaknesses may call the reliability of
blockchain evidence into question.
Recall that blockchain’s reliability flows from the fact that a network of
independent and disinterested third-party nodes decides through consen-
sus whether to add a new block to the chain, and that the chain’s immuta-
bility comes from that same network of third parties detecting and
rejecting alterations. Both of these qualities, then, rely upon a common
assumption: that the network is truly disinterested (decentralized, in
blockchain parlance).53 Even in the original definition given by Satoshi
Nakamodo for blockchain, the assumption of disinterest is made:
blockchain is “peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a pub-
lic history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impracti-
cal for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU
power.”54 When we challenge the assumption that the nodes are honest,
both the reliability and the immutability of the blockchain disappear.
The network can become centralized in a variety of ways. The tradi-
tional approach, called a “51% attack,” was long thought to be infeasible




53. Nakamodo, supra note 12, at 4.
54. Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
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amount of computing power required.55 However, new methods are be-
ing pioneered that allow for the centralization of the blockchain. For ex-
ample, Ittay Eyal and Emin Sirer of Cornell University have developed a
method called “selfish mining” that would require far less computing
power and, therefore, poses a serious threat.56 We must also bear in mind
that blockchain is a developing technology, and new vulnerabilities can
(and surely will) be found.
51% attacks are fairly straightforward. They are the product of “the
ability of someone controlling a majority of network hash rate to revise
transaction history and prevent new transactions from confirming.”57 Es-
sentially, when a party or group of parties controls a majority of the net-
work, they control the consensus mechanism.58 Accordingly, they can
then decide which new blocks will be accepted by the network and can
accept changes to existing blocks that honest networks would detect and
reject.59 While this was a largely theoretical concern for much of
blockchain’s history, 51% attacks have become a real problem for
blockchain in recent years.60 Researchers have projected that 51% at-
tacks are poised to increase in the future.61
With a 51% attack providing the ability to deny the addition of legiti-
mate blocks, allow the falsification of new blocks, and alter the contents
of existing blocks, serious evidentiary concerns are posed. Discussed in
more depth in Part V below, the possibility of such an attack undermines
one of the primary goals of evidence law—ensuring that evidence is
reliable.62
The issue presented to would-be attackers is that 51% attacks can re-
quire a truly massive amount of computing power.63 This threat is most
real in the context of small, public blockchains.64 Because public
blockchains are not permissioned, and anyone can join, it becomes simple
for assailants to achieve the hashing power necessary to centralize and
falsify the blockchain. Private blockchains pose a threat of a different
55. Alyssa Hertig, Blockchain’s Once-Feared 51% Attack Is Now Becoming Regular,
COINDESK (June 8, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchains-feared-51-attack-now-be
coming-regular [https://perma.cc/X42X-85UW].
56. See Ittay Eyal & Emin Gu¨n Sirer, Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vul-
nerable (Nov. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Cornell University), https://
www.cs.cornell.edu/~ie53/publications/btcProcFC.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4BU-VMV5].
57. 51% Attack, Majority Hash Rate Attack, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/glossary/
51-percent-attack [https://perma.cc/SEC8-36J5] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
58. See 51% Attack, LEARN CRYPTOGRAPHY, https://learncryptography.com/cryptocur
rency/51-attack [https://perma.cc/X2FG-X489] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
59. Id.
60. See Hertig, supra note 55 (Monacoin, Bitcoin Gold, Zencash, Verge, and Litecoin
Cash were all subjected to 51% attacks in the month period between May 8 and June 8,
2018).
61. See Olga Neroda, 51% and the Future of POW, HACKER NOON (Oct. 14, 2019),
https://hackernoon.com/51-attacks-and-the-future-of-pow-402266905bfa [https://perma.cc/
3QJC-DFM2].
62. See infra Part V.
63. See Hertig, supra note 55.
64. Id.
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type. Here, because entry onto the network as a node is permissioned, the
administrator of the blockchain can control who has access to hashing
power. When new nodes are carefully screened, this could preclude 51%
attacks altogether by ensuring that dishonest actors cannot join the net-
work. However, it also allows the administrator of the blockchain to only
grant permission to new nodes that align with his interests. An adminis-
trator could, in fact, specifically choose to permission only those nodes
that would cooperate with him to falsify the record.
For large, public blockchains, one could be forgiven for thinking that
this is a matter of purely academic concern. Consider, for example, the
Bitcoin blockchain. As of the time of this writing, the Bitcoin blockchain
has a hash rate of 47,117,891 terahashes (equal to one trillion hashes) per
second.65 As such, a would-be assailant would need the raw computing
power necessary to perform over 23,448,946 trillion hashes per second to
be able to perform such an attack. However, while that may sound re-
mote, consider that a group of bitcoin miners has twice nearly achieved
such control.66 In January of 2014, Ghash.io, a pool of bitcoin miners,
obtained 42% of the hashing power on the Bitcoin blockchain.67 In June
of 2014, the same group reached 50%, only a single percentage point
away from the level necessary to decentralize the blockchain through
traditional means.68 Even on large, public blockchains such as Bitcoin,
the chance of centralization is a real threat and should be considered
when discussing the evidentiary standards that should apply to this type
of technology.
The obvious drawback for would-be assailants is that a 51% attack re-
quires 51% of the network power. Even though it is possible for a coordi-
nated group to achieve such power, it may not always be feasible. This
was thought, for most of blockchain’s history, to insulate it from attack.69
Then along came selfish mining.70
Selfish mining is a technique pioneered by Ittay Eyal and Emin Gu¨n
Sirer of Cornell University that allows for a group controlling much less
than 51% of the network power to take control of the network.71 In fact,
Eyal and Sirer posit that “a group of any size can compromise the sys-
tem.”72 Recall that when an honest miner solves a crypto puzzle, it an-
nounces the resulting new block to the chain, and miners start looking for
65. Hash Rate, BLOCKCHAIN.COM, https://www.blockchain.com/en/charts/hash-rate
[https://perma.cc/ACA3-JJQF] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
66. See Daniel Cawrey, Are 51% Attacks a Real Threat to Bitcoin?, COINDESK (June




69. See Eyal & Sirer, supra note 56.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
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the next block to solve.73 Selfish miners, conversely, do not.74 Instead,
selfish miners:
keep [their] discovered blocks private, thereby intentionally forking
the chain. The honest nodes continue to mine on the public chain,
while the pool [of selfish miners] mines on its own private branch. If
the pool discovers more blocks, it develops a longer lead on the pub-
lic chain, and continues to keep these new blocks private. When the
public branch approaches the pool’s private branch in length, the
selfish miners reveal blocks from their private chain to the public.75
This technique advantages selfish miners by forcing the honest miners
to devote their resources to solving crypto puzzles that have no value.76
This in turn incentivizes honest miners to join the pool of selfish miners.77
There is some debate on what percentage of total miners behaving self-
ishly begins to post a threat of decentralization.78 However, it is clear that
it is much less than the traditionally assumed 51%.79 Ettal and Sirer pose
that “the threshold is close to zero. . . . [I]f less than 100% of the miners
are honest, the system may not be incentive compatible.”80 Even the
highest possible threshold is fairly low—“mining protocol will never be
safe against attacks by a selfish mining pool that commands more than 1/3
of the total mining power of the network.”81
Finally, blockchain is vulnerable to many of the traditional weaknesses
associated with the digital storage of information. Recall that some
blockchains use password-like private keys to authenticate the identity of
users requesting a transaction.82 Like traditional passwords, private keys
can be lost, forgotten, or stolen. If a malicious actor gains access to a
user’s public and private keys, they can easily create fraudulent transac-
tions with the legitimate user’s identity. In the cryptocurrency context,
this typically means currency would be stolen. In other use cases, it allows
for fraudulent information to be placed into and “verified by” the
blockchain.
It should be noted that these are just a few of the types of attacks to
which blockchain is vulnerable, and new methods of undermining
blockchain are still being discovered.83 Further, blockchain technology
can be adapted to defend against different kinds of attacks.84 For exam-
ple, the pioneers of selfish mining have proposed a protocol that would
73. See supra Part II.B.








82. See supra Part II.A.
83. See generally Joseph Bonneau, Hostile Blockchain Takeovers, in FINANCIAL CRYP-
TOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 92–100 (Aviv Zohar et al. eds., 2018).
84. Eyal & Sirer, supra note 56.
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lower the risk of successful selfish mining attacks.85 However, not all
blockchains have implemented this protocol.86 Because protocols can
vary, determining the reliability of any given blockchain record requires
examining the protocols not of blockchain generally, but of the specific
blockchain in question. Accordingly, when considering what the rule of
decision pertaining to blockchain admissibility should be, as the author
endeavors to do in Part V below, it is important to develop a standard
that is sufficiently flexible to account for the variance in protocols.
III. BLOCKCHAIN AS HEARSAY UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
We now move from the foreign and unwelcoming shores of computer
engineering back to the relative familiarity of legal analysis. Applying
well-established evidentiary principles to what has been discussed above,
it becomes clear that blockchain evidence is almost always inadmissible in
federal court, and is only admissible under limited, factually specific sce-
narios. However, as will be explored infra, this state of affairs contradicts
the very purpose of hearsay doctrine.
Blockchain’s most powerful opponent is the rule against hearsay, en-
shrined in FRE 802.87 The underlying purpose of the rule against hearsay
is to ensure the reliability of evidence introduced at trial.88 Consider,
then, the discussion above about the reliability of blockchain evidence.89
In the absence of a 51% attack, selfish mining, or other exploitation of
blockchain’s vulnerabilities, blockchain technology produces records that
are extraordinarily reliable.90 This should be borne in mind, as it shows
that the current FRE, which preclude almost entirely the admission of
blockchain evidence, must be amended.
FRE 802 simply provides that hearsay is not admissible unless explic-
itly made admissible.91 The threshold inquiry, then, is whether blockchain
evidence can properly be called hearsay. FRE 801 explains that hearsay is
an out-of-court statement of a person offered for “the truth of the matter
asserted.”92 Consider first who is the relevant declarant of statements
contained in a blockchain record. It is well-established that a machine
cannot make a statement.93 Ergo, if the relevant declarant is the
blockchain network itself, there is no statement and no hearsay issue.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. FED. R. EVID. 802.
88. BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, § 245 (“The factors upon which the value of testi-
mony depends are the perception, memory, narration, and sincerity of the witness[.] . . .
The rule against hearsay is designed to ensure compliance with these ideal conditions, and
when one of them is absent, the hearsay objection becomes pertinent.”).
89. See supra Part II.
90. Nakamodo, supra note 12.
91. FED. R. EVID. 802.
92. Id. at 801.
93. See United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007); City of Webster
Groves v. Quick, 323 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959).
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However, correctly viewed, the declarant is not the blockchain itself but
the person inputting data into the blockchain. The blockchain merely
stores information that is input by users.94 The types of machines that
courts have held cannot create statements are those that produce data
independent of human input, such as vehicle speed detection devices.95
Accordingly, properly considered, the declarant is not the blockchain
ledger, but the user inputting data into the ledger.
A “statement” requires expressive intent96—a requirement that
blockchain satisfies easily. The only purpose of putting information into a
blockchain is to create a record of it. Therefore, the act of placing infor-
mation on a blockchain per se establishes a statement sufficient to meet
this element. It is equally clear that blockchain records are out of court.
They are not made at trial and are not made under oath. Blockchain evi-
dence, then, is clearly hearsay when it is offered for the truth of the mat-
ter asserted.
It is difficult to imagine for what else blockchain evidence could be
asserted. Typical non-truth-of-the-matter-asserted rationales for introduc-
ing what would otherwise be hearsay include showing notice, impeach-
ment of a witness, or effect on the listener.97 Unless a witness has falsely
testified at trial about the contents of a blockchain record, such records
have no impeachment value. The “listener” of statements included on the
blockchain record is the network. There is no probative value in showing
the effect of a statement on the network because there is no effect on the
network. However, even if a non-truth purpose could be found, using
such a purpose limits how lawyers can argue the evidence presented—
evidence admitted for a specific purpose can only be used to argue that
purpose.98 This needlessly constrains an advocate’s ability to argue on the
basis of reliable blockchain evidence. Further, the ability to use a non-
truth purpose to admit blockchain evidence will inevitably be fact spe-
cific—there may be no non-truth purpose for which such evidence is rele-
vant. Because blockchain evidence is generally reliable, its admissibility
should not require the fortuitous happenstance that a given case has facts
that make the evidence amenable to admission for non-truth purposes.
This again makes clear that blockchain evidence will almost always, if not
literally always, fall within the definition of hearsay.
One theory that has been advanced by some commentators is that
blockchain evidence should be considered non-hearsay because it is com-
puter-generated.99 This argument proceeds by analogy, based on the
94. Bacon et al., supra note 13, at 2.
95. Quick, 323 S.W.2d at 390.
96. See id.
97. BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, § 249.
98. Id. § 59.
99. Angela Guo, Blockchain Receipts: Patentability and Admissibility in Court, 16 CHI.
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 440, 446–47 (2017); James Ching, Is Blockchain Evidence Inadmissi-
ble Hearsay?, LAW.COM (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.law.com/sites/jamesching/2016/01/07/is-
blockchain-evidence-inadmissible-hearsay/?slreturn=20190914194232 [https://perma.cc/
9VPZ-5WRV].
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Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado.100 In Lizar-
raga-Tirado, the court held that Google Earth satellite imagery that had a
labeling tack automatically placed on it by the Google Earth program was
not hearsay because it was not a statement made by a person.101 Because
the “relevant assertion [wasn’t] made by a person[, but rather] by the
Google Earth program,” there was no statement and, therefore, no hear-
say.102 Angela Guo argued in her article Blockchain Receipts: Patentabil-
ity and Admissibility in Court that, “[s]ince humans do not actually
generate the receipts on the blockchain, it is possible that courts will rec-
ognize distributed ledger receipts as computer-generated evidence and
therefore not hearsay.”103
However, Lizarraga-Tirado is uninstructive because blockchain evi-
dence is not meaningfully comparable to Google Earth satellite images.
Google Earth is a self-contained system: once it has been established, it
does not require any human input to produce data. The satellite automat-
ically takes photos, which it automatically marks with GPS information
and then automatically uploads to the internet. Blockchain, conversely,
requires human interaction. The beginning of any blockchain transaction
is a user inputting data. That data is then processed automatically to gen-
erate the blockchain record, but the provision of the data originally
comes from a human source. Accordingly, while it was proper for the
Lizarraga-Tirado court to find that there was no declarant (and therefore
no hearsay) of a statement by a totally self-contained and autonomous
process, it does not follow that the logic of that case should be extended
to a process, like blockchain, that begins with humans inputting informa-
tion. In processes such as those, the proper view is that the user beginning
the process by inputting the information is a declarant who is making a
hearsay statement.
A. HEARSAY EXCLUSIONS GENERALLY WILL NOT APPLY
TO BLOCKCHAIN EVIDENCE
As any trial lawyer could tell you, the possibility that evidence is admis-
sible is not foreclosed simply because it meets the standard definition of
hearsay.104 The FRE create a variety of exceptions and exclusions from
hearsay.105 However, whether blockchain evidence can meet an exclusion
will be extremely fact-dependent, and blockchain evidence will typically
only satisfy the weakest of the exceptions.
100. Guo, supra note 99, at 445.
101. United States v. Lizarraga-Tirado, 789 F.3d 1107, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2015).
102. Id. at 1110.
103. Guo, supra note 99, 446–47.
104. See BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, §245.
105. See FED. R. EVID. 801, 803–04, 807. Note that the hearsay exclusions, listed at FRE
801, differ from exceptions at least in the taxonomical sense. An exception to hearsay ac-
knowledges that a statement is hearsay but provides for admissibility nonetheless. See id.
803–04. An exclusion, conversely, transforms a statement that meets the definition of hear-
say and categorizes it as non-hearsay. See id. 801(d).
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We turn first to the exclusions from hearsay, established at FRE
801(d).106 FRE 801(d) creates two general categories of exclusions from
hearsay.107 The first category pertains to previous statements given by a
witness testifying at trial.108 This exclusion does not warrant extensive
discussion. It requires that the prior statement be subject to cross-exami-
nation, which blockchain entries are not.109 Accordingly, this exclusion
will never be met in the blockchain context.
The second category of exclusions from hearsay concerns statements
against an opposing party.110 Here, the facts of the case will dictate
whether a party can avail themselves of this exclusion. If a statement was
made by the party against whom it is offered, then it is not hearsay.111
This would allow for the admission of blockchain evidence where the ad-
verse party had entered the data onto the blockchain. However, cabining
blockchain’s admissibility so tightly is undesirable for a variety of reasons.
Foremost among these is that it does not enable litigants to introduce
their own blockchain records that help their case. Under this formulation,
blockchain evidence is only a sword, never a shield. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that a case is brought for breach of contract. The plaintiff claims that
the defendant never paid for the services that the plaintiff provided. The
defendant’s claim is simple: he claims he did. He has a blockchain record
showing that the correct amount of cryptocurrency funds was transferred
from the defendant to the plaintiff. However, he is unable to introduce
this evidence on an 801(d) theory as only the plaintiff may avail himself
of FRE 801(d)(2). The defendant’s meritorious defense may now be
unprovable.
B. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS GENERALLY WILL NOT APPLY
TO BLOCKCHAIN EVIDENCE
Having determined that blockchain evidence will generally be hearsay
that meets no exclusion, we must examine what exceptions, if any, would
save blockchain from inadmissibility. The exclusions to the rule against
hearsay are found in three places in the FRE: 803, 804, and 807.112 The
exceptions of FRE 803 are available regardless of whether the declarant
is available to testify.113 Conversely, FRE 804 exceptions require that the






111. Id. Note that a variety of types of statements by individuals related to the party-
opponent, such as employees, co-conspirators, agents, spokesmen, and joint ventures are
deemed to be the statements of a party-opponent for purposes of FRE 801(d)(2). Id.
801(d)(2)(A)–(E). This broadens the number of factual scenarios in which litigants may
use this exception. It is not necessary that the named party himself input the data into the
blockchain, if such an associated party did.
112. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
113. Id. 803.
114. Id. 804.
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tion to hearsay, a catch-all provision to allow for the admission of hearsay
that meets no recognized exception but, nonetheless, “has equivalent cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”115 Considering blockchain
evidence through each of these lenses in turn, it becomes clear that
blockchain evidence is only generally admissible through the residual ex-
ception and that it may be difficult to admit even then.
FRE 803 provides for a litany of exceptions,116 many of which do not
merit discussion here. Two exceptions require attention, however. First,
the public records exception of FRE 803(8) merits discussion, as more
and more governments are turning to blockchain technology for the pro-
vision of governmental services.117 Second, the business records excep-
tion of FRE 803(6) should be discussed because some scholars have
proposed that it provides for the admission of blockchain evidence over a
hearsay objection.118 These arguments are not meritorious but deserve
response.
1. The Public Records Exception for Blockchain in the Public Sector
Blockchain technology is seeing more and more application in govern-
ment services.119 Although no American government agency has yet
widely adopted blockchain technology, the use of blockchain in foreign
governments has bearing on the discussion of American evidentiary law.
It is far from unthinkable that courts could be confronted with the need
to examine the records of foreign governments to resolve issues of fact in
multijurisdictional cases. Further, it is possible that the U.S. government
will begin to employ blockchain technology in the future. In either case,
the most relevant hearsay exception for this type of record is the public
records exception.
FRE 803(8) provides an exception to hearsay when a record of a public
office is introduced which “(A) . . . sets out: (i) the office’s activities; (ii) a
matter observed while under a legal duty to report . . . ; or (iii) . . . factual
findings from a legally authorized investigation; and (B) the opponent
does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indi-
cate a lack of trustworthiness.”120
Blockchain’s typical use cases in government may fall within this ex-
ception. For example, blockchain has been employed to “digitize the pro-
cess of issuing business licenses” in Dubai.121 A blockchain record
produced by a public office detailing which business licenses had been
issued would fall within the ambit of FRE 803(8) because it would be a
record that “sets out the office’s activities.”122 Another proposed use case
115. Id. 807.
116. Id. 803.
117. See, e.g., Refaat, supra note 5.
118. Guo, supra note 99, at 448; Ching, supra note 99.
119. See, e.g., Refaat, supra note 5.
120. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
121. Refaat, supra note 5.
122. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
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involves using blockchain to streamline the recordkeeping process for ve-
hicle registration and property ownership.123 Here, too, these would
likely fall within the publication records exception. However, not all gov-
ernment use cases for blockchain would be admissible under public
records. Take, for example, one commonly proposed use case—
blockchain for election management.124 The blockchain, it is proposed,
could track the election and ensure its legitimacy.125 The voting records
of such an election, however, would not fall within FRE 803(8). It would
not set out the actions of a public office, but rather the actions of private
citizens making voting decisions.126 It would not be a matter observed
while under a legal duty to report; in fact, because who voters choose to
vote for is secret, it would be a matter observed while under a legal duty
not to report. It would further not be the findings of a legally authorized
investigation. In short, this government use case, and many others like it,
would not be, as a general proposition, admissible in federal court. As we
have seen again and again, where blockchain evidence has any potential
for admission under the current FRE standards, it requires a very specific
set of facts.
2. The Business Records Exception
The business records exception of FRE 803(6) provides an exception to
hearsay when a record is introduced and:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by . . . someone with
knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling . . . ;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custo-
dian or another qualified witness, or by a certification . . . ; and
(E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.127
The history of the business records exception may seem to suggest that
blockchain, at least in the cryptocurrency context, is a textbook example
of a business record. In fact, the historical roots of the business records
exception lie in seventeenth century England, where tradesmen were al-
lowed to introduce their ledgers into evidence.128 Blockchains are, essen-
123. John Palfreyman, Blockchain for Government: Building Trust, Demolishing Bu-
reaucracy, BLOCKCHAIN PULSE: IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ibm
.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/02/blockchain-government-building-trust-demolishing-bureau
cracy/ [https://perma.cc/XN7Z-ULXB].
124. Jane Susskind, Comment, Decrypting Democracy: Incentivizing Blockchain Voting
Technology for an Improved Election System, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 785, 806 (2017).
125. Id. at 806–07.
126. Id. at 806.
127. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
128. BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, § 285.
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tially, digital ledgers.129 However, the rationale behind allowing physical
ledgers into evidence was that “[t]he regularity and continuity of the
records [were] calculated to train the recordkeeper in habits of preci-
sion,” which ensured the reliability of the data contained in the ledger.130
This breaks the similarity between physical ledgers and blockchain.
Blockchain ledgers have not yet obtained the ubiquity of use that the
ledgers of the tradesmen in early England had. There is nothing to sug-
gest that there is sufficient regularity of keeping blockchain records to
have trained blockchain users to be precise.
Some commentators have advanced the argument that, nonetheless,
FRE 803(6) provides for the admission of blockchain evidence.131 Al-
though the scholarship on the subject is exceedingly sparse, the consensus
amongst those few commentators who have weighed in seems to be in
favor of that proposition. First proposed by James Ching, the argument
focuses on the reliability of the blockchain algorithm and whether
blockchain receipts are “records.”132 While Ching correctly notes that the
drafters of FRE 803(6) intended for “records” to be interpreted
broadly,133 he fails to discuss one of the key elements of the business
records exception:134 that the record be kept “in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling.”135
Taking into account this missing element of the business records analysis,
it becomes clear that blockchain records will rarely be admissible as busi-
ness records and that Ching’s argument fails.
At the onset, we must determine whose regularly conducted activity is
at issue—the user inputting the data or the blockchain network itself? In
incentive-based mining systems, such as the Bitcoin and Ethereum
blockchains, miners can and do make a profession of providing mining
services to the blockchain in exchange for compensation.136 A facially
nonfrivolous argument could be made that the miner’s constant devotion
of resources (a regularly conducted activity) in exchange for compensa-
tion (a business or occupation) is sufficient to bring blockchain records
within the ambit of the business records exception. However, this view is
specious. Recall the classic analogy of blockchain to a physical ledger.
The blockchain user is akin to the person writing in a traditional ledger;
the blockchain is akin to the physical ledger itself. Applying the business
records exception to a physical ledger, there is no question whether we
are concerned with the activity of the ledger or the person writing in it.
The physical ledger has no cognizable occupation or calling; the inquiry
focuses on the person inputting information into the ledger. The same
129. See Nakamodo, supra note 12, at 3.
130. BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, § 286.
131. Guo, supra note 99, at 448; Ching, supra note 99.
132. Ching, supra note 99.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (emphasis added).
136. Castor, supra note 30.
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should hold true in the blockchain context, and the argument that the
network’s own business, occupation, or calling could allow for the busi-
ness records exception to apply to blockchain records must fail.
Application of the business records exception turns, then, on whether
the record was made in the course of the user’s regularly conducted activ-
ity in the course of business. In determining whether this exception is
applicable, courts consider whether the record was “made for something
other than a regular business purpose.”137 If it was, then the record falls
outside the scope of the business records exception.138 Currently, very
few individuals and organizations regularly conduct business via
blockchain technology. Accordingly, most, if not all, current applications
of blockchain technology would fall outside the scope of the business
records exception.
Assuming that a court held that a given blockchain record was created
for regular business purposes, the difficulty of admitting blockchain evi-
dence through FRE 803(6) is compounded by the question of who may
serve as a sponsoring witness. The exception requires the testimony or
certification of a custodian of record or another qualified witness.139 A
custodian can be defined as the person who is “responsible for securing
and controlling access to evidence and maintaining the evidence in ex-
actly the condition it was in when received.”140 In the blockchain context,
there is no one human custodian of record, but rather, it is the network as
a whole that maintains the record. Therefore, “another qualified witness”
would need to sponsor the testimony.141
Courts have held that “[a] qualified witness is simply one who can ex-
plain and be cross-examined concerning the manner in which the records
are made and kept.”142 In the context of blockchain, however, this is no
simple task. To be “qualified” under that standard, a potential witness
would need to be competent not only to testify to the manner in which
the data entered into the blockchain was gathered by the user, but also to
the specifics of how the specific blockchain at issue processed that data to
produce the record. In many instances, identifying such a uniquely com-
petent witness will prove impossible. Considering the above, the business
records exception provides little value to litigants looking to admit
blockchain evidence.
3. The Residual Exception—Blockchain’s Last, Best Hope for
Admissibility
Finally, we turn to the residual exception of FRE 807.143 FRE 807 cre-
137. United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
138. Id.
139. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
140. Custodian, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
141. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
142. Wallace Motor Sales, Inc. v. Am. Motor Sales Corp., 780 F.2d 1049, 1061 (1st Cir.
1985).
143. FED. R. EVID. 807.
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ates a catch-all exception for evidence constituting hearsay that does not
fall within a specifically recognized exception to the rule against hear-
say.144 Evidence qualifies for a residual exception when it (1) “has
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” to established
hearsay exceptions; (2) is offered to prove a material fact; (3) is the most
probative evidence on point that can reasonably be obtained; and (4)
“admitting it will best serve the purposes of [the FRE] and the interests
of justice.”145 Note that FRE 807 also requires that the opposing party be
given reasonable notice of the intention of the evidence’s proponent to
offer hearsay under this exception.146 This requirement is designed to
provide the opponent a fair opportunity to respond to the hearsay excep-
tion argument.147 This requirement is instructive in tailoring an ideal legal
standard for the admission of blockchain evidence, as detailed in Part V
below.148
Blockchain evidence makes a strong case for admission under the
residual exception. Where a litigant introduces evidence from a
blockchain and shows that the blockchain was not compromised, the
guarantees of trustworthiness are in fact higher than most established
hearsay exceptions. However, the legislative history of the residual excep-
tion militates against its long-term use to admit blockchain evidence. As
McCormick explains, the Senate Advisory Committee proposed the
residual exception to
provide for treating new and presently unanticipated situations
which demonstrate a trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifi-
cally stated exceptions. The House Judiciary Committee deleted the
provisions entirely, believing they injected too much uncertainty into
the law and arguing that additional hearsay exceptions should be cre-
ated by amending the rules. . . . In arguing to restore these excep-
tions[,] . . . the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that it intended
that the residual exception should be used “very rarely, and only in
exceptional circumstances.”149
Although the residual exception has seen a good deal of use over the
years,150 it has never been used in the long term as a repeated backdoor
for an entire class of evidence. The preceding history of the residual ex-
ception makes clear that it would be inappropriate to use it in such a




147. See Jonathan E. Grant, The Pre-Trial Notice Requirement of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(24), 36 DRAKE L. REV. 91, 97–98 (1986).
148. See infra Part V.
149. BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, § 324 (footnote and internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1277, at 18–20 (1974), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7066).
150. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, The Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule: The
Complete Treatment, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 265, 303–04 (2000).
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Further, in cases that are not clear-cut, trial court judges may struggle
to decide whether blockchain evidence has the necessary guarantees of
trustworthiness. Determining whether a blockchain record is trustworthy
is a technically complex endeavor, requiring exploration of the distribu-
tion of mining power to detect decentralization through exploits such as
51% attacks and selfish mining.151 Necessarily, making the determination
of whether a blockchain record is trustworthy will require the testimony
of experts. This will doubtlessly lead to a battle of the experts, requiring
heavy expenditure of both time and resources for the court and the liti-
gants. Judges would be placed in the difficult position of making determi-
nations about highly technical testimony without the manageable judicial
standards that could be provided by an enumerated exception. Instead,
they must parse through complex, technical issues to decide whether
there are “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.”152
This incredibly vague standard further complicates an already difficult ju-
dicial task. It becomes clear that, while the residual exception is currently
the best method to admit blockchain evidence, on policy grounds, it is not
a particularly good one.
The blockchain paradox, then, has presented itself in full. The animat-
ing concern of the rule against hearsay is ensuring the reliability of evi-
dence.153 Except in limited circumstances (when the blockchain has been
centralized by bad actors), blockchain is exceedingly reliable. Except in
limited circumstances (when the facts of a given case allow for a narrow
exception or exclusion as detailed above), blockchain is patently inadmis-
sible unless under an exception that is not intended to serve as a long-
term route to admissibility for entire categories of evidence.154 Under the
FRE as currently written, blockchain is almost always reliable and almost
never admissible. The question then becomes how the law should adapt
to admit reliable blockchain evidence and exclude unreliable blockchain
evidence.
IV. CURRENTLY IMPLEMENTED SOLUTIONS TO
THE BLOCKCHAIN PARADOX
Very few countries, including the United States, have meaningfully ad-
dressed the problems presented by blockchain evidence. Unique among
U.S. states is Vermont, where the state’s Blockchain Enabling Act (the
Act) creates a statutory scheme whereby, subject to certain conditions,
blockchain evidence is presumptively authentic and admissible.155 How-
ever, considering the discussion in Parts II.A and II.B above (especially
regarding selfish mining) the conditions placed on admissibility by the
legislature are inadequate. The Vermont approach represents a good first
151. See Eyal & Sirer, supra note 56.
152. FED. R. EVID. 807.
153. BROUN ET AL., supra note 43, § 324.
154. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 1277, at 18–20).
155. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1913 (2018).
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effort but fails to take into account blockchain’s vulnerabilities. The result
is an overinclusive standard whereby unreliable blockchain evidence is
admissible. The legislative history concerning the Act shows that these
issues were not considered by the Vermont legislature.156 In the interna-
tional context, the Supreme People’s Court of China has recently held
that blockchain evidence is per se admissible.157 Beyond these two exam-
ples, explored in more depth below, few jurisdictions have squarely ad-
dressed the admissibility of blockchain evidence.
First, we consider Vermont’s Blockchain Enabling Act. The Act pro-
vides that blockchain records are self-authenticating and admissible when
they are “accompanied by a written declaration of a qualified person,
made under oath,” and the declaration states (1) the qualifications of the
affiant; (2) “the date and time the record entered the blockchain;” (3) the
date and time it was pulled from the blockchain; (4) that the record’s
entry in the blockchain was part of “a regular conducted activity; and” (5)
“the record was made by the regularly conducted activity as a regular
practice.”158 These requirements closely mirror the business records ex-
ception to hearsay.159 After having satisfied the requirements of the Act,
the proponent of blockchain evidence need only show that (1) the record
was made by someone with knowledge; and (2) the record was made at or
near the time of the event recorded.160 This creates a strong presump-
tion—too strong of a presumption—in favor of the admissibility of
blockchain evidence, even when the blockchain has become centralized.
The Act attempts to weaken this presumption by providing that the
Act does not apply when “the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.”161 This
language is imported part and parcel from a previous version of FRE
803(6).162 This language implicitly places the burden on the opponent of
the evidence to show that the blockchain evidence is unreliable.163 Fur-
ther, the Act does not distinguish between public and private
blockchains, applying the same evidentiary standard to both.164 While the
Act provides a good starting point for a manageable evidentiary standard
for blockchain records, these two flaws require correction.
156. Joanna Diane Caytas, Blockchain in the U.S. Regulatory Setting: Evidentiary Use in
Vermont, Delaware, and Elsewhere, COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. (May 30, 2017), http://
stlr.org/2017/05/30/blockchain-in-the-u-s-regulatory-setting-evidentiary-use-in-vermont-
delaware-and-elsewhere/ [https://perma.cc/NJE9-K7CK].
157. Zuı`gao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Hulianwang Fayua`n Shenli Anjian Ruogan Wenti
De Guidı`ng [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues in Internet
Court Trial Cases] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct. Sept. 6, 2018, effective Sept. 7,
2018), CLI.3.321342 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Supreme People’s Court Interpretation
No. 16].
158. Tit. 12, § 1913.
159. Compare tit. 12, § 1913, with FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
160. Tit. 12, § 1913.
161. Id. § 1913(b)(2).
162. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803(6), with tit. 12, § 1913.
163. Tit. 12, § 1913(b)(2).
164. Id. § 1913(c)(5).
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The Supreme People’s Court of China recently issued an interpretation
of law holding that blockchain evidence is admissible per se.165 This arises
against the backdrop of recent changes in the Chinese court system. In
2017, China created the nation’s first internet court in Hangzhou.166 Two
more internet courts opened in the cities of Beijing and Guangzhou in
2018.167 These specialized courts have jurisdiction over suits arising out of
online shopping disputes, internet service contracts, online copyright is-
sues, domain names, and similar matters.168 As part of an ongoing judicial
reform for the Chinese courts, the Chinese Supreme People’s Court de-
termined that evidence stored on blockchain is admissible in cases before
the three internet courts.169
In light of the foregoing discussion, it should be evident that a rule of
per se admissibility is ill-advised. While blockchain is almost always relia-
ble, it is not always reliable.170 Accordingly, a per se rule fails to allow for
the nuanced level of reliability that a sophisticated system of justice
demands.
V. THE NEED FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING
STANDARDS OF ADMISSIBILITY FOR
BLOCKCHAIN EVIDENCE
What is the solution to the blockchain paradox? A variety of ap-
proaches could be followed. The legislature could do nothing and wait for
courts to address the problem. Interpretations of existing hearsay excep-
tions could be promulgated, broadening them to reach blockchain evi-
dence. Courts could abuse the residual exception to hearsay in perpetuity
to allow for blockchain evidence. The proper approach, however, is to
formally amend the Federal Rules of Evidence creating an enumerated
exception that creates manageable, blockchain-specific standards for
admission.
First, this comment addresses why an amendment is the proper route
by which to develop this law. An amendment promotes two major policy
goals: uniformity and ex ante clarity. Finally, this comment concludes by
articulating a proposed amendment which establishes manageable evi-
dentiary standards that balance the need for blockchain evidence against
the interest in keeping out unreliable evidence.
165. Supreme People’s Court Interpretation No. 16, supra note 157.






170. Nolan Bauerle, What Are Blockchain’s Issues and Limitations?, COINDESK, https://
www.coindesk.com/information/blockchains-issues-limitations [https://perma.cc/7N4M-
72U5] (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
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A. WHY AN AMENDMENT IS THE PROPER METHOD TO CHANGE THE
LAW CONCERNING BLOCKCHAIN EVIDENCE
Congress has recognized from time to time that the law of evidence
must adapt to keep pace with changes in technology. For example, FRE
101 was amended on December 1, 2011, providing, inter alia, for the in-
troduction of FRE 101(b)(6).171 FRE 101(b)(6), for the first time, estab-
lished that “a reference to any kind of written material or any other
medium includes electronically stored information.”172 This is but one ex-
ample of Congress’s recognition that evidence law must change with the
changing times. The purpose of the FRE was to “allow ‘expansion (of the
Federal Rules of Evidence) by analogy to cover new or unanticipated
situations.’”173 However, this analogy has its limits. Because the reliabil-
ity of blockchain evidence depends on nuanced factors that cannot ade-
quately be captured by analogy, to serve the overarching policy goal of
ensuring the reliability of evidence, blockchain deserves a specially tai-
lored standard.
Blockchain is “the biggest thing since the Internet.”174 While the tech-
nology is still developing, it has already begun to cause major overhauls
in a variety of industries.175 Before blockchain litigation becomes com-
monplace in the courts, Congress should take the opportunity to amend
the FRE to create a uniform, predictable standard.
An amendment is the sole mechanism available for the development of
the law on this issue that will provide such a uniform, predictable result.
Uniformity of the law is of paramount importance, as it ensures that like
parties will be treated alike, regardless of whether they bring suit in
Alaska or Alabama.176 If the law is developed through an ex post facto
approach, it will inevitably become fractured as different judges take dif-
ferent approaches and arrive at different decisions. This in turn leads to
disparate treatment under the law based on what jurisdiction a litigant
happens to appear in (and in the early blockchain cases, possibly even
based on what particular judge is assigned to a given case). Additionally,
such an approach encourages forum shopping. If a plaintiff knows that
this certain class of evidence is or is not admissible under the law of a
certain jurisdiction, they can opt to bring suit in the forum most favorable
171. FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6).
172. Id.
173. United States v. Bibbs, 564 F.2d 1165, 1169 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting Hearings
on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 4 (1973) (statement of Professor Cleary, Reporter for the Advi-
sory Comm.)).
174. Bitcoin Magazine, Why the Bitcoin Blockchain is the Biggest Thing Since the In-
ternet, NASDAQ (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/why-the-bitcoin-block
chain-is-the-biggest-thing-since-the-internet-cm608228 [https://perma.cc/989B-QRGC].
175. See Aitken, supra note 7 (blockchain in healthcare); Quora, supra note 6
(blockchain in healthcare); Refaat, supra note 5 (blockchain in government).
176. See J. Collin Spring, Pilots out of Uniform: How the Sixth Circuit’s Etihad Decision
Undermines the Purpose of the Montreal Convention, 84 J. AIR L. & COM. 153, 160–61
(2019).
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to them. It need not stretch the imagination to believe that a cunning
plaintiff’s attorney, knowing that the opposition needs to adduce
blockchain evidence to state their defense, might choose to bring suit in
the jurisdiction with the most restrictive standards to introduce
blockchain evidence. Conversely, where the evidence is beneficial to
plaintiffs, they will doubtlessly bring suit in the forum where the devel-
oped standard is most lenient. An amendment to the FRE explicitly de-
tailing the standard to which blockchain evidence should be held would
abate this risk.
Further, an amendment alone provides clarity and predictability for the
parties seeking to introduce blockchain evidence. At the core of the prin-
ciple of legality is foreseeability.177 Litigants in early blockchain cases
should be provided with foreseeability and should not be forced to guess
if a potentially crucial piece of evidence will be allowed in. Because, espe-
cially when a case revolves around the potential breach of a smart con-
tract that doubles as a legal contract, there may be no other source to
provide dispositive information, it is essential that litigants be given ex
ante clarity on the standards of blockchain admissibility so as to avoid
prejudicing their ability to present their claims and defenses.
Inaction would be particularly perilous. As discussed above, the cur-
rent best approach to admit blockchain evidence is the residual exception
to hearsay.178 However, the residual exception provides an extremely am-
biguous standard—“equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.”179 This approach gives judges little guidance on how to resolve
crucial evidentiary questions and will likely lead to disparate and arbi-
trary results. Further, this exception was intended by its drafters to be
used in extraordinary circumstances. If applied in the long term as a
method to introduce blockchain evidence, it will cease to perform the
exceptional function that it was intended to perform.
It is clear, then, that something must be done—and the best thing to do
is amend the FRE today in anticipation of the litigatory issues of
tomorrow.
B. RESOLVING THE PARADOX: A PROPOSED STANDARD
OF ADMISSIBILITY
Considering the above discussion, the following amendment to the
FRE is proposed to be inserted at FRE 803(24):180,181
177. Alan Nissel, Continuing Crimes in the Rome Statute, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 653, 674
n.112 (2004).
178. See supra Part III.B.3.
179. FED. R. EVID. 807.
180. Recall from Part III that FRE 803 contains those exceptions to hearsay which do
not require the unavailability of the declarant. The proposed blockchain exception is prop-
erly housed here because the availability of the declarant is immaterial to the reliability of
the evidence when the other conditions placed upon admissibility by the proposed excep-
tion are met.
181. The currently existing FRE 803(24) would be restyled FRE 803(25).
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(24) Records stored on a blockchain ledger. A record stored on a
blockchain system if:
(a) the record is:
(i) from a public blockchain or from a private blockchain ad-
ministered by the opposing party, and the opposing party
does not show that the blockchain technology generating the
record was compromised in such a manner that indicates the
record’s lack of trustworthiness;
(ii) pulled from a private blockchain which is administered by
someone other than the opposing party, and the proponent of
the evidence shows that the blockchain technology generating
the record was not compromised in such a manner that indi-
cates the record’s lack of trustworthiness;
(b) the record was made at or near the time of the event;
(c) if the record did not execute a smart contract, then the record
was made by someone with knowledge; and
(d) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of a qualified
witness, or by certification.
(e) as used in this section:
(i) “Blockchain” means a cryptographically secured, chrono-
logical, and decentralized consensus ledger or consensus
database maintained via the internet, peer-to-peer network,
or other interaction.
(ii) “Blockchain technology” means computer software or
hardware or collections of computer software or hardware, or
both, that utilize or enable a blockchain.182
(iii) “Public blockchain” means a blockchain utilizing a net-
work which can be freely joined by anyone.
(iv) “Private blockchain” means a blockchain utilizing a
permissioned network, which can only be joined by those in-
vited by the network administrator.
(v) A party “administers” a blockchain when it has the right
and ability to permit or deny new nodes from joining the
blockchain network.
(vi) If a blockchain does not meet either definition given it
shall be treated as a private blockchain administered by some-
one other than the opposing party.
Under the proposed amendment, the burden to show the reliability or
unreliability shifts based on the nature of the blockchain at issue. This
protects both the reliability of the evidence and provides for judicial effi-
ciency. When dealing with records pulled from a public blockchain, espe-
cially a large public blockchain, the chance of centralization attacks is
lowered and centralization is harder to prove. As a result, showing unreli-
182. Note that the first and second definitions provided by the proposed amendment
mirror the definitions provided in Vermont’s Blockchain Enabling Act. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1913 (2018).
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ability will necessarily require a large expenditure of time and resources
both from the parties and the court. Accordingly, the burden is properly
placed on the opponent of the evidence to show that the blockchain re-
cord is not reliable. In many instances, this will obviate the need to ad-
duce evidence of reliability at all; if the parties agree that the blockchain
was not compromised, no foundation need be laid to show the same.
Conversely, in private blockchains, the chance of centralization is
heightened, and ensuring reliability requires that, if the proponent of the
evidence is the administrator of the blockchain, he carries the burden to
show the reliability of the records sought to be admitted. Because a pro-
ponent-administrator of a blockchain record could selectively control
those persons invited to join the network, such that he controls the con-
sensus mechanism (and could therefore create false entries), courts
should require a greater showing of reliability. Parties should not be al-
lowed to centralize their private blockchain, create false evidence, and
then admit it in court simply because it came from a blockchain.
These concerns apply primarily to litigants seeking to introduce evi-
dence from blockchains which they themselves administer. Where a liti-
gant seeks to introduce evidence from a private blockchain administered
by the opposing party, no such concerns exist. The opposing party should
be given the chance, at least in theory, to show that their own blockchain
was compromised, but the policies for the heightened standard do not
apply. Therefore, these instances should be governed by the same logic
that applies to public blockchain records.
Note further that the knowledge requirement is removed when the evi-
dence sought to be admitted pertains to a smart contract transaction. Be-
cause smart contracts are self-executing,183 no showing of personal
knowledge is necessary if the technology is reliable. The record itself has
sufficient knowledge of its contents when smart contracts are at issue.
Where smart contracts are not at issue, however, personal knowledge
should be required of the declarant. Blockchain, generally, can verify that
the information placed in it has not been changed. It cannot, however
(absent verification protocols or a self-executing smart contract), verify
the data that is input. Accordingly, the declarant’s personal knowledge is
important to show the level of reliability that justifies a hearsay
exception.
This proposal represents a balanced approach to the admissibility of
blockchain evidence that accounts for its vulnerabilities without placing
undue burdens on litigants. In doing so, it solves the blockchain paradox:
it transforms blockchain evidence from being almost always reliable and
almost never admissible to being almost always reliable and admissible
when it is. Congress should amend the FRE to adopt such a standard.
183. See supra Part II.A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In summation, considering the discussion of blockchain technology in
Part III above, blockchain evidence is extraordinarily reliable, except in
the exceptional circumstance. The current approaches that jurisdictions
have taken to the admissibility of blockchain evidence leave much to be
desire. Vermont and China have both created schemes which are overin-
clusive—they permit for both the admission of reliable and unreliable
blockchain evidence. The FRE, which have yet to be amended to address
squarely the issue of blockchain evidence, are underinclusive—they
would preclude as hearsay evidence that is profoundly reliable (and relia-
bility is the animating concern of the rule against hearsay). Accordingly,
an amendment to the FRE is necessary. This amendment should be sensi-
tive and narrowly tailored. The author urges Congress to consider adopt-
ing the amendment in Part V, above.
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